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Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clarify something that seems rather important at this point? You said here & in the past that a weakening of the American executive authority teas a factor in this whole outcome. Now, there have been reports that former President Nixon, w/ your advice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that Watergate intruded & he could not carry through on that. Is that a historic fact or not?
Secretary Kissinger: To my, to the best of my knowledge, President Nixon had never actually decided on any particular action. The Washington Special Action Group at that period was considering a number of reactions that could be taken to the beginning flagrant violations of the agreements. This was done on an interdepartmental basis - including the Department of State, my office, the Department of Defense - and had reached certain options. Then President Nixon, as it turned out, never made a final decision between these options. To what extent it was influenced by Watergate is a psychological assessment that one can only speculate about.
20:31:40 Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia developing after the Indochina situation. What will the priorities of the United States be in recognizing its existing commitments & in making new ones?
Secretary Kissinger: We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies & on other countries in that area & on their perceptions of the United States; & we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time, because surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, & if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable. The President has already reaffirmed our alliance w/ Japan, our defense treaty w/ Korea, & we, of course, also have treaty obligations & important bases in the Philippines. We will soon be in consultation w/ many other countries in that area, including Indonesia & Singapore & Australia & New Zealand, & we hope to crystallize an Asian policy that is suited to present circumstances w/ close consultation w/ our friends.
20:33:33 Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon & do you have any idea of the number of Americans who remained behind?
Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the number of Americans that remained behind. I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out, but how many chose to stay behind we won't know until tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that left was the Ambassador & some of his immediate staff, & we won't know really until we get the report from them.
20:34:16 Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu welcome to seek asylum in this country, & is there any possibility that the United States would recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam?
Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu should seek asylum in the United States, he would be, of course, received. The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam.
20:34:47 Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what went wrong, what were the flaws in American foreign policy toward Indochina all these years? Why was it that so many Administrations repeatedly underestimated the power of the North Vietnamese & overestimated power of ARVN? Kissinger: And over-estimated? ARVN / South Vietnam.
Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I think this is not the occasion, when the last American has barely left Saigon, to make an assessment of a decade & a half of American foreign policy, because it could equally well be argued that if five Administrations that were staffed, after all, by serious people dedicated to the welfare of their country came to certain conclusions, that maybe there was something in their assessment, even if for a variety of reasons the effort did not succeed. As I have already pointed out, special factors have operated in recent years. But I would think that what we need now in this country, for some weeks at least, & hopefully for some months, is to heal the wounds & to put Viet-Nam behind us & to concentrate on the problems of the future. That certainly will be the Administration's attitude. There will be time enough for historic assessment.
Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference;
NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate.
NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk
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NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clarify something that seems rather important at this point? You said here & in the past that a weakening of the American executive authority teas a factor in this whole outcome. Now, there have been reports that former President Nixon, w/ your advice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that Watergate intruded & he could not carry through on that. Is that a historic fact or not? Secretary Kissinger: To my, to the best of my knowledge, President Nixon had never actually decided on any particular action. The Washington Special Action Group at that period was considering a number of reactions that could be taken to the beginning flagrant violations of the agreements. This was done on an interdepartmental basis - including the Department of State, my office, the Department of Defense - and had reached certain options. Then President Nixon, as it turned out, never made a final decision between these options. To what extent it was influenced by Watergate is a psychological assessment that one can only speculate about. 20:31:40 Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia developing after the Indochina situation. What will the priorities of the United States be in recognizing its existing commitments & in making new ones? Secretary Kissinger: We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies & on other countries in that area & on their perceptions of the United States; & we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time, because surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, & if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable. The President has already reaffirmed our alliance w/ Japan, our defense treaty w/ Korea, & we, of course, also have treaty obligations & important bases in the Philippines. We will soon be in consultation w/ many other countries in that area, including Indonesia & Singapore & Australia & New Zealand, & we hope to crystallize an Asian policy that is suited to present circumstances w/ close consultation w/ our friends. 20:33:33 Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon & do you have any idea of the number of Americans who remained behind? Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the number of Americans that remained behind. I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out, but how many chose to stay behind we won't know until tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that left was the Ambassador & some of his immediate staff, & we won't know really until we get the report from them. 20:34:16 Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu welcome to seek asylum in this country, & is there any possibility that the United States would recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam? Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu should seek asylum in the United States, he would be, of course, received. The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam. 20:34:47 Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what went wrong, what were the flaws in American foreign policy toward Indochina all these years? Why was it that so many Administrations repeatedly underestimated the power of the North Vietnamese & overestimated power of ARVN? Kissinger: And over-estimated? ARVN / South Vietnam. Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I think this is not the occasion, when the last American has barely left Saigon, to make an assessment of a decade & a half of American foreign policy, because it could equally well be argued that if five Administrations that were staffed, after all, by serious people dedicated to the welfare of their country came to certain conclusions, that maybe there was something in their assessment, even if for a variety of reasons the effort did not succeed. As I have already pointed out, special factors have operated in recent years. But I would think that what we need now in this country, for some weeks at least, & hopefully for some months, is to heal the wounds & to put Viet-Nam behind us & to concentrate on the problems of the future. That certainly will be the Administration's attitude. There will be time enough for historic assessment. Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference; NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk