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Continued... Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference a few weeks back to those who believe in the domino theory & while I don't remember exactly your words, the point was it is easy to laugh at it but there is some justification for subscribing to that theory. Now that this chapter is over, can you give us your estimate of the security of Thailand & other countries in the area, or the near area? Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to make a final assessment. There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing w/ them. So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal w/ them, & we are determined to manage & to progress along the road towards a permanent peace that we have sought; but there is no question that there will be consequences.
20:11:03 Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, or elaborate in more detail, what we did thru various intermediaries to bring about, I think you said, as humane a political solution as possible, & why those efforts seem to have failed? Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree w/ the proposition that these efforts have failed because at least some of the efforts, especially those related to evacuation, were carried out thru intermediaries. We dealt with - I think it is premature for me to go into all of the details, but we did deal w/ Hanoi & w/ the PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government thru different intermediaries, & we were in a position to put our views & receive responses.
20:12:09 Q. May I follow on that by saying, why then, was it necessary to stage a rescue operation in the final stages? Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for some contingents would be necessary. I believe that the dynamics of the situation in South Viet-Nam & the impatience of the North Vietnamese to seize power brought about an acceleration of events in the last day & a half. But you will remember there was a period of about five days when both civilian & U.S. personnel were evacuated without any substantial opposition—in fact, more than five days, about a week.
20:13:04 Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you now anticipate that the North Vietnamese intend to move in & forcefully seize Saigon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for an orderly transition? Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult to judge at this moment. I think it is important to point out that the Communist demands have been escalating as the military situation has changed in their favor. So, a week ago they were asking only for the removal of President Nguyen Van Thieu. When he resigned, they immediately asked for the removal of his successor, specifying that General Duong Van Minh would be acceptable. When President Tran Van Huong resigned in favor of General Minh, he was now described as a member of a clique which includes all of the members of his administration. A week ago, the Communist demand was for the removal of American military personnel. This quickly escalated into a removal of all American personnel. Then a new demand was put forward for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese military apparatus. When that was agreed to, they added to it the demand for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being aimed at is a substantial political takeover. Now, whether it is possible to avoid a battle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I would hope, and we certainly have attempted to work in that direction, that such a battle can be avoided. And it is basically unnecessary because it seems to us that the South Vietnamese Government is prepared to draw the conclusions from the existing situation and, in fact, look forward to correspond to the demands of the Communist side. Continued...
Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975;
NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate.
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NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk Continued... Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference a few weeks back to those who believe in the domino theory & while I don't remember exactly your words, the point was it is easy to laugh at it but there is some justification for subscribing to that theory. Now that this chapter is over, can you give us your estimate of the security of Thailand & other countries in the area, or the near area? Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to make a final assessment. There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing w/ them. So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal w/ them, & we are determined to manage & to progress along the road towards a permanent peace that we have sought; but there is no question that there will be consequences. 20:11:03 Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, or elaborate in more detail, what we did thru various intermediaries to bring about, I think you said, as humane a political solution as possible, & why those efforts seem to have failed? Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree w/ the proposition that these efforts have failed because at least some of the efforts, especially those related to evacuation, were carried out thru intermediaries. We dealt with - I think it is premature for me to go into all of the details, but we did deal w/ Hanoi & w/ the PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government thru different intermediaries, & we were in a position to put our views & receive responses. 20:12:09 Q. May I follow on that by saying, why then, was it necessary to stage a rescue operation in the final stages? Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for some contingents would be necessary. I believe that the dynamics of the situation in South Viet-Nam & the impatience of the North Vietnamese to seize power brought about an acceleration of events in the last day & a half. But you will remember there was a period of about five days when both civilian & U.S. personnel were evacuated without any substantial opposition—in fact, more than five days, about a week. 20:13:04 Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you now anticipate that the North Vietnamese intend to move in & forcefully seize Saigon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for an orderly transition? Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult to judge at this moment. I think it is important to point out that the Communist demands have been escalating as the military situation has changed in their favor. So, a week ago they were asking only for the removal of President Nguyen Van Thieu. When he resigned, they immediately asked for the removal of his successor, specifying that General Duong Van Minh would be acceptable. When President Tran Van Huong resigned in favor of General Minh, he was now described as a member of a clique which includes all of the members of his administration. A week ago, the Communist demand was for the removal of American military personnel. This quickly escalated into a removal of all American personnel. Then a new demand was put forward for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese military apparatus. When that was agreed to, they added to it the demand for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being aimed at is a substantial political takeover. Now, whether it is possible to avoid a battle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I would hope, and we certainly have attempted to work in that direction, that such a battle can be avoided. And it is basically unnecessary because it seems to us that the South Vietnamese Government is prepared to draw the conclusions from the existing situation and, in fact, look forward to correspond to the demands of the Communist side. Continued... Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk