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Q. Dr. Kissinger, what caused the breakdown of the intent which was spoken of earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a measure of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, & what is your total assessment now of the effectiveness or the non-effectiveness of the whole Paris accord operation, which you said at the outset was intended to achieve peace w/ honor for the United States?
Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means, & when the transfer of power to General Minh took place - a person who had been designated by the other side as a counterpart worth talking to, they would be prepared to talk with – we thought that a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable. Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obviously changed signals. Why that is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that now that the American presence is totally removed & very little military structure is left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced this sudden shift to a military option, or what would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient opportunity to analyze. Now as to the effectiveness of the Paris accords, I think it is important to remember the mood in this country at the time that the Paris accords were being negotiated. I think it is worth remembering that the principal criticism that was then made was that the terms we insisted on were too tough, not that the terms were too generous. We wanted what was considered peace w/ honor, was that the United States would not end a war by overthrowing a government w/ which it had been associated. That still seems an objective that was correct. There were several other assumptions that were made at that time that were later falsified by events that were beyond the control of, that indeed were unforeseeable by, anybody who negotiated these agreements, including the disintegration of or the weakening of executive authority in the United States for reasons unconnected w/ foreign policy considerations. So, the premises of the Paris accords, in terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, & in terms of other factors, tended to disintegrate. I see no purpose now in reviewing that particular history. Within the context of the time, it seemed the right thing to do.
20:24:15 Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on that. What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it?
Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see what grouping emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges & what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that.
Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are in abeyance w/ the government in South Viet-Nam ?
Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair statement. Continued...
Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference;
NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk
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NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk Q. Dr. Kissinger, what caused the breakdown of the intent which was spoken of earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a measure of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, & what is your total assessment now of the effectiveness or the non-effectiveness of the whole Paris accord operation, which you said at the outset was intended to achieve peace w/ honor for the United States? Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means, & when the transfer of power to General Minh took place - a person who had been designated by the other side as a counterpart worth talking to, they would be prepared to talk with – we thought that a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable. Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obviously changed signals. Why that is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that now that the American presence is totally removed & very little military structure is left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced this sudden shift to a military option, or what would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient opportunity to analyze. Now as to the effectiveness of the Paris accords, I think it is important to remember the mood in this country at the time that the Paris accords were being negotiated. I think it is worth remembering that the principal criticism that was then made was that the terms we insisted on were too tough, not that the terms were too generous. We wanted what was considered peace w/ honor, was that the United States would not end a war by overthrowing a government w/ which it had been associated. That still seems an objective that was correct. There were several other assumptions that were made at that time that were later falsified by events that were beyond the control of, that indeed were unforeseeable by, anybody who negotiated these agreements, including the disintegration of or the weakening of executive authority in the United States for reasons unconnected w/ foreign policy considerations. So, the premises of the Paris accords, in terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, & in terms of other factors, tended to disintegrate. I see no purpose now in reviewing that particular history. Within the context of the time, it seemed the right thing to do. 20:24:15 Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on that. What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it? Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see what grouping emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges & what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that. Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are in abeyance w/ the government in South Viet-Nam ? Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair statement. Continued... Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference; NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk