NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk
Mr. Secretary, looking back on the war now, would you say that the war was in vain, & what do you feel it accomplished?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a long time before Americans will be able to talk or write about the war w/ some dispassion. It is clear that the war did not achieve the objectives of those who started the original involvement nor the objectives of those who sought to end that involvement, which they found on terms which seemed to them compatible w/ the sacrifices that had been made. What lessons we should draw from it, I think we should reserve for another occasion. But I don't think that we can solve the problem of having entered the conflict too lightly by leaving it too lightly, either.
20:26:06 Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the future, has America been so stunned by the experience of Viet-Nam that it will never again come to the military or economic aid of an ally? I am talking specifically in the case of Israel.
Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a speech a few weeks ago April 17, one lesson we must learn from this experience is that we must be very careful in the commitments we make but that we should scrupulously honor those commitments we do make. I believe that the experience in the war, that the war has had, can make us more mature in the commitments we undertake & more determined to maintain those we have. I would therefore think that w/ relation to other countries, including Israel, that no lessons should be drawn by the enemies of our friends from the experiences in Viet-Nam.
20:27:16 Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the developments in the last week or so, would you agree
that there was never any hope of stabilizing the South Vietnamese military situation after the withdrawal from the northern regions?
Secretary Kissinger: When the President met w/ General Weyand Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in Palm Springs, the judgement was that there was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat less than 50-50, but still some hope. The situation deteriorated w/ every passing day. Those of you whom I briefed at that time will remember that I said that whatever - and I said it in public testimony on innumerable occasions - that whatever objective we may set ourselves & whatever assessment we make about the outcome, the Administration had no choice except to pursue the course that we did, which was designed to save the Americans still in Viet-Nam & the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass.
20:28:35 Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions: could you tell us, are you now reassessing the amount of humanitarian aid which Congress should give to the South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us the President's reaction & mood during the past 24 hours?
Secretary Kissinger: With respect to humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we spoke to the congressional leadership this morning, & we urged them to pass the humanitarian part of the aid request that we have submitted to the Congress. The President pointed out that he would make a later decision as to what part of that humanitarian aid could be used in South Viet-Nam after the political evolution in South Viet-Nam becomes clearer. The President's mood was somber & determined, & we all went thru a somewhat anxious 24 hours, because until the last helicopter had left, we could not really know whether an attack on any of these compounds might start & whether missiles might be used against our evacuation.
Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference;
NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk
Sign in with Google
Similar Sub-themes
NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk Mr. Secretary, looking back on the war now, would you say that the war was in vain, & what do you feel it accomplished? Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a long time before Americans will be able to talk or write about the war w/ some dispassion. It is clear that the war did not achieve the objectives of those who started the original involvement nor the objectives of those who sought to end that involvement, which they found on terms which seemed to them compatible w/ the sacrifices that had been made. What lessons we should draw from it, I think we should reserve for another occasion. But I don't think that we can solve the problem of having entered the conflict too lightly by leaving it too lightly, either. 20:26:06 Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the future, has America been so stunned by the experience of Viet-Nam that it will never again come to the military or economic aid of an ally? I am talking specifically in the case of Israel. Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a speech a few weeks ago April 17, one lesson we must learn from this experience is that we must be very careful in the commitments we make but that we should scrupulously honor those commitments we do make. I believe that the experience in the war, that the war has had, can make us more mature in the commitments we undertake & more determined to maintain those we have. I would therefore think that w/ relation to other countries, including Israel, that no lessons should be drawn by the enemies of our friends from the experiences in Viet-Nam. 20:27:16 Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the developments in the last week or so, would you agree that there was never any hope of stabilizing the South Vietnamese military situation after the withdrawal from the northern regions? Secretary Kissinger: When the President met w/ General Weyand Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in Palm Springs, the judgement was that there was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat less than 50-50, but still some hope. The situation deteriorated w/ every passing day. Those of you whom I briefed at that time will remember that I said that whatever - and I said it in public testimony on innumerable occasions - that whatever objective we may set ourselves & whatever assessment we make about the outcome, the Administration had no choice except to pursue the course that we did, which was designed to save the Americans still in Viet-Nam & the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass. 20:28:35 Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions: could you tell us, are you now reassessing the amount of humanitarian aid which Congress should give to the South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us the President's reaction & mood during the past 24 hours? Secretary Kissinger: With respect to humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we spoke to the congressional leadership this morning, & we urged them to pass the humanitarian part of the aid request that we have submitted to the Congress. The President pointed out that he would make a later decision as to what part of that humanitarian aid could be used in South Viet-Nam after the political evolution in South Viet-Nam becomes clearer. The President's mood was somber & determined, & we all went thru a somewhat anxious 24 hours, because until the last helicopter had left, we could not really know whether an attack on any of these compounds might start & whether missiles might be used against our evacuation. Vietnam War End; Saigon Evacuation; Secretary of State; 29Apr75; 1975; Press Conference; NOTE: Up to any continuous 24 minutes of 20:00:00 - 20:47:26 sold at per reel rate. NOTE: FOR ORDERING See: www.footagefarm.co.uk or contact us at: Info@Footagefarm.co.uk